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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MARY L. SASSIN
Petitioner,
vs
Case No.

960083-CA

BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY AND WALMART STORES
INC.
Respondents.
BRIEF OF PETITIONER

APPELLATE JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-1 6( 1 ) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
ISSUE 1
Was the determination by the Board of Review of the Industrial
Commission of Utah, Department of Employment Security, (hereinafter
the "Board") that it is a reasonable employment practice to require
a switchboard operator to walk 100 feet to get a drink of water
reasonable?

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The determination whether the Board's decision relative to
whether an individual is discharged for just cause will be reviewed
under

UTAH CODE ANN. §

63-46b-16(4)(h)(i)

for reasonableness.

Albertsons Inc. v. Dept. of Employment Security, 854 P.2d 570, 573
(Utah App. 1993).
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE
(R. 56-57, 17, 30).
ISSUE 2
Was the Board's failure to consider Petitioner's contention,
that the employer never showed the element of knowledge, arbitrary
or capricious?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This is a legal determination that requires no deference to
the Commission pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-1 6(4) (h) . Adams
v. Board of Review of Indus, Com'n, 821 P. 2d 1, 4 (Utah App. 1991).
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE
R. 57-59, 16, 24, 29-30).

2

ISSUE 3
Was the Board's failure to consider Petitioner's contention,
that the employer never showed the element of control, arbitrary or
capricious?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This is a legal determination that requires no deference to
the Commission pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-16(4).

Adams v.

Board of Review of Indus. Com'n, 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah App. 1991).
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE
(R. 59, 30).
ISSUE 4
Was the Board's failure to consider Petitioner's contention,
that the employer never showed the actions of Petitioner had a
serious effect on the employee's job or the employer's interests,
arbitrary or capricious?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This is a legal determination that requires no deference to
the Commission pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-16(4).

Adams v.

Board of Review of Indus. Com'nf 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah App. 1991).

PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE
(R. 59-60, 36).
3

ISSUE 5
Was the Board's failure to consider Petitioner's contention,
that the employer never met its burden because the only evidence
the employer presented was inadmissible hearsay, arbitrary or
capricious?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This is a legal determination that requires no deference to
the Commission pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-16(4).

Adams v.

Board of Review of Indus. Com'n. 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah App. 1991).
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE
(R. 60-63, 13, 39, 5, 13, 16-18).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule

562-5b-102(1)(a), Utah Administrative Code
562-5b-102(1)(b), Utah Administrative Code
562-5b-102(1)(c)(2), Utah Administrative Code
562-5b-102(1)(c)(3), Utah Administrative Code
562-5b-103(1), Utah Administrative Code
562-5b-108(1)(a), Utah Administrative Code

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case is before the Court on petition to review an order
of the Department of Employment Security administrative agency.

4

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Petitioner was fired by WalMart.
received, unemployment benefits.

She applied

for, and

That decision was overturned by

Department of Employment Security Administrative Law Judge Terry J.
Kump (Hereinafter "ALJ") and affirmed by the Board.

It is from

that decision Petitioner appeals to this Court.
DISPOSITION IN THE AGENCY
The Board issued a final decision on January 5, 1996.

The

Board affirmed the decision of the ALJ in all respects denying
Petitioner unemployment benefits. However, the Board reversed the
ALJ relative to the repayment of unemployment benefits. The Board
ordered Petitioner

repay the benefits pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §

35-4-406(5) instead of UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-4-406(4) as had been
ordered by the ALJ.

(R.71-75).
STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

Petitioner was hired by WalMart Stores on or about

November 8, 1990.

(R. 1).

2.

Petitioner was fired on or about August 1, 1995. (R. 1).

3.

Petitioner is a 57 year old woman (R. 1).

4.

Petitioner, at the time of firing, was a telephone

switchboard operator working eight hours a day. (R. 15).
5.

Petitioner filed for unemployment insurance benefits on

August 3, 1995.

(R. 2-4).
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6.

A Department of Employment Security representative found

Petitioner was not at fault in the discharge and granted Petitioner
unemployment insurance benefits on August 18, 1995.

(R. 4).

7. WalMart, through the Frick Company, appealed the granting
of unemployment insurance benefits on or about August 28, 1995. (R.
7).
8.

WalMart's appeal was heard by ALJ, Terry J. Kump on

October 11, 1995, at hearing in St. George, UT.

(R. 12).

FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUE 1
(Reasonableness of policy)
9. The employer representative testified that Petitioner was
fired for having a drink of water in the phone area contrary to
store policy.
10.

(R. 18-19).

The employer representative testified that Petitioner

could get water by walking a distance of about 100 feet into a back
room.

(R. 17).
11.

Petitioner testified it was not easy to go into the back

room to get a drink of water.
12.
employer

The ALJ stated
offered

the

(R. 20).

lf

the Administrative Law Judge finds the

claimant

a

reasonable

alternative

by

permitting her to keep the beverage relatively close at hand but
out of the customer sales area.11
13.
regard.

(R. 38).

The Board affirmed the decision of the ALJ in this
(R. 73).
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FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUE 2
(Knowledge)
14.

The employer representative testified that the employee

manual states that it is unacceptable to have food or drink on the
floor area.
15.

(R. 16).

The employer representative admitted that Petitioner's

work area was separate from the customer flow area.
16.

(R. 29).

Petitioner testified that her work area was not on the

floor area.

(R. 24-25).

17. The employer representative testified that many employees
had drinks in the area where Petitioner had her drink.

(R. 30).

18. The employer representative testified that Petitioner was
the only employee ever fired for having a drink of water in the
phone area.
19.

(R.30).

Petitioner testified she was not the only phone operator

who had water in the phone area. (R. 23).
20.

Petitioner testified she was fired because of a prior

problem with the employer representative.
21.

(R. 20).

Based on these facts, the ALJ found that Petitioner had

the requisite knowledge of the drink policy.

(R.38).

22. Petitioner specifically appealed the ALJ's determination
that the facts supported a finding of the requisite knowledge of
the drink policy. (R. 57-59).
23.

In it's decision, the Board never addressed the issue of

whether the element of knowledge of the drink policy was shown by
the employer.

(R. 71-75).
7

FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUE 3
(Control)
24.

Petitioner testified she had the drink in a phone area,

in part, because of a strep infection from which she was suffering.
(R. 20).
25. In his decision, the ALJ made no determination of whether
the element of control was shown.

(R. 35-40).

26. Petitioner specifically appealed this issue to the Board,
arguing that due to the strep infection, Petitioner did not have
the requisite control.
27.

(R. 59).

In it's decision, the Board never addressed the issue of

whether the element of control was shown by the employer.

(R. 71-

75).
FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUE 4
(Serious effect on employer)
28. The ALJ found that the employer provided no evidence that
it had been harmed in any way by Petitioner's conduct.
29.

(R. 36).

However, the ALJ nevertheless ruled in favor of the

employer, stating that harm was shown.

(R. 39).

30. Petitioner specifically appealed this issue to the Board,
arguing the employer failed to show how Petitioner's actions had an
adverse effect on the employee's job or the employer's interest and
that the ALJ's decision was not consistent with his findings.

(R.

59-60).
31.

In it's decision, the Board never addressed the issue of

whether the employer showed the actions of Petitioner had a serious
8

effect on the employee's job or the employer's interests.

(R. 71-

75).
FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUE 5
(Employer's burden)
32.

The ALJ found that WalMart failed to provide the

necessary documentation prior to hearing, but went ahead with the
hearing stating that his decision would be based on the testimony.
(R. 13).
33.

The employer representative had little knowledge of the

events regarding Petitioner's discharge and requested the court
permit the reading of several employee statements.
34.

The court specifically

inadmissible.
35.

(R. 16).

ruled the statements to be

(R. 16-17)

The employer representative testified regarding the

statements which the Court had ruled were inadmissible.

(R. 17-

18).
36. Petitioner specifically appealed this issue to the Board,
arguing that the hearsay testimony was insufficient to meet the
employer's burden.
37.

(R. 60-63).

In it's decision, the Board never addressed the issue of

whether the employer met its burden in establishing just cause.
(R. 71-75).
38. On or about January 30, 1996, Petitioner filed a petition
for writ of review with this court, seeking review of the decision
of the Board.

(R. 79-80).

9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Employer's policy requiring switchboard operators walk 100
feet for a drink of water is an unreasonable employment practice.
The determination by the Board that it is a reasonable employment
practice, should be reversed. The failure of the Board to consider
the issues of knowledge, control, serious effect on the employer,
or whether the employer met its burden at hearing was arbitrary and
capricious and should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
I.
IT IS NOT A REASONABLE EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE TO REQUIRE A
SWITCHBOARD OPERATOR TO WALK 100 FEET TO GET A DRINK OF WATER.
Petitioner is a 57 year old female who was hired by WalMart
Stores on or about November 8, 1990.

She was fired on or about

August 1, 1995. (R. 1). Petitioner was fired for having a drink of
water in the phone area.

(R. 18-19).

At the time of firing,

Petitioner was a telephone switchboard operator. (R. 15).
At hearing, Petitioner testified that "I did have strept [sic]
throat as well as a virus and it was very hard to spend so many
hours without a drink and when he says it was easy for me to go
back and get a drink off the sales floor was not.1'
The employer representative testified that

(R. 20).

fl

[a]ny time she

wanted to get a drink of water, we made it available to her.

She

could go right inside the backroom, which is only about a hundred
feet away from the fitting room. . . ." (R. 17). (Emphasis added).

10

The ALJ stated
employer

offered

"the Administrative

the

claimant

a

Law Judge

reasonable

finds the

alternative

by

permitting her to keep the beverage relatively close at hand but
out of the customer sales area.11

(R. 38).

Petitioner specifically appealed this holding to the Board,
asserting that requiring Petitioner walk 100 feet to get a drink of
water when her mouth would become dry from answering phones was not
a reasonable employment practice.

(R. 56-57).

In affirming the ALJ, the Board stated:
The Board of Review is of the opinion that the employer's
policy may have been excessively harsh for the period
that the claimant had strep throat. However, as noted
above, the problem had been going on for several months.
The claimant did not simply violate the policy during the
time she had strep throat. If the claimant had shown a
willingness to comply with the policy prior to the time
she developed strep throat, the Board of Review would be
more persuaded by her arguments that she needed the water
close at hand during the time she had strep throat that
the employer should reasonably have made an exception for
her during that time.11 (R. 73).
It is Petitioner's contention that the employer's policy was
excessively harsh regardless of whether Petitioner had a strep
infection.

The fact she may have also been ill is of little

consequence, relative to the issue of whether the policy is an
unreasonable employment practice.

Requiring a phone operator to

walk a distance of 100 feet for a drink of water is simply not
reasonable, and does not support a finding of just cause for
discharge.
In reviewing the Board's determination of just cause, the
appellate court will determine whether the Board's decision was
reasonable

pursuant

to

UTAH

CODE

11

ANN.

§ 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i);

Albertsons Inc. v. Dept. of Employment Security, 854 P.2d 570, 573
(Utah App. 1993).
The

decision

reasonable.

Rule

of

the

Board

in

this

situation

was

562-5b-102(1)(a), Utah Administrative

not
Code

states:
(a) Culpability.
This is the seriousness of the conduct or the severity of
the offense as it affects continuance of the employment
relationship. The discharge must have been necessary to
avoid actual or potential harm to the employer's rightful
interests.
A discharge would not be considered
"necessary11 if it is not consistent with reasonable
employment practices. . . . (Emphasis added).
Rule

562-5b-108(1)(a), Utah Administrative

Code, further

states:
The reasonableness of the employer's rules will depend on
the necessity for that rule as it affects the employer's
interests. Rules which are contrary to general public
policy or which infringe upon the recognized rights and
privileges of individuals may not be reasonable. An
employer must have broader prerogatives in regulating
conduct when employees are on the job than when they are
not. An employer must be able to make rules for employee
on-the-job conduct that reasonably further the legitimate
business interests of the employer. An employer is not
required to impose only minimum standards, but there may
be some justifiable cause for violations of rules that
are unreasonable or unduly harsh, rigorous or exacting.
(Emphasis added).
Here Petitioner worked eight hours a day as a switchboard
operator.

(R. 15). Regardless of whether she had an illness, the

policy she walk 100 feet to get a drink of water was unreasonable.
Petitioner's mouth would get dry answering the switchboard. If she
got up and walked 100 feet to a back room to get a drink of water
every time her mouth was dry, she simply could not answer the
phones as necessary.
12

The requirement Petitioner answer the phone as well as walk
100 feet every time her mouth became dry is inconsistent if not
impossible.

Such a requirement clearly runs contrary to general

public policy and infringes upon Petitioner's recognized rights and
privileges. For that reason, employer's policy was not consistent
with reasonable employment practices and the decision of the Board
should be reversed as being unreasonable.
II. THE BOARD'S FAILURE TO CONSIDER PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT THE
EMPLOYER NEVER SHOWED THE ELEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE WAS ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS.
The employer representative testified that the employee manual
states that it is unacceptable to have food or drink on the floor
area. (R. 16).

(Emphasis added).

However, he admitted that

Petitioner's work area was separate from the customer flow area.
(R. 29). Petitioner testified that her work area was not on the
floor area.
The

(R. 24-25).

employer

representative

further

testified

that many

employees had drinks in the area where Petitioner had her drink.
(R. 30). He also testified that Petitioner was the only employee
ever fired for having a drink of water in the phone area.

(R.30).

Petitioner testified she was not the only phone operator who
had water in the phone area. (R. 23). She also testified she was
fired because of a prior problem with the employer representative.
(R. 20).
In spite of foregoing facts, the ALJ found Petitioner had the
requisite knowledge of the store policy.
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(R. 38).

Petitioner

specifically

appealed

that

decision

to

the

Board.

In her

''Memorandum in Support of Appeal,11 (R. 53-66) Petitioner argued as
follows:
The employee must have had a knowledge of the conduct
which the employer expected . . . Knowledge may not be
established unless the employer gave a clear explanation
of the expected behavior or had a pertinent written
policy, except in the case of a flagrant violation of a
universal standard of behavior.
If the employer's
expectations are unclear, ambiguous or inconsistent, the
existence of knowledge is not shown.
Rule 562-5b102(1)(b), Utah Administrative Code. [R. 57-58].
Here there was no clear explanation of the policy.
Claimant was initially allowed to take drinks into the
fitting room.
At some point in time, the Employer
decided to reverse this policy in favor of the company
handbook regarding such behavior. The handbook states
that f'eating food, drink, or chewing gum while on the
sales floor is unacceptable behavior.11 (Transcript of
hearing at page 4). [R. 16] (Emphasis added). [R. 58].
Claimant testified the area where she answered phones was
not in the general customer area, specifically stating
that f,it was not out on the floor11.
(Transcript of
Hearing at page 12).
[R. 24]. This testimony was
actually supported by the Employer representative who
testified that the area in which Claimant was working is
separated from the regular customer flow area. [R. 58]
(Transcript of hearing at page 17). [R. 29].
Actions of other employees shows there was no coherent
policy regarding beverages in Claimant's work area. This
is born out by Claimant's testimony that there were
numerous other employees who were taking beverages into
the phone area. [R. 58] (Transcript of Hearing at page
18). [R. 30].
The Employer manual implies it is acceptable to have
beverages in the non-floor areas. Claimant did not work
out on the floor. Therefore, it is questionable Employer
even had a company policy regarding drink in the phone
area of which Claimant would have knowledge. [R. 58].
At best Employer's policy was unclear, ambiguous or
inconsistent.
The employee manual implies it is
perfectly acceptable to have beverages in the non-floor
areas. The purported verbal policy regarding beverages
in the non-floor areas is inconsistent with that policy.
14

That is born out by Claimant's testimony that
many
employees had beverages in the phone area. This policy,
if it did exist, was so inconsistent and ambiguous that
the employees could not have knowledge. [R. 59].
In it's decision, the Board never addressed the issue of
whether the element of knowledge was shown by the employer.

(R.

71-75).
This Court has held that:
The question of whether the Commission's action
constitutes arbitrary action for want of adequate
findings is governed by our determination of whether this
court is able to conduct a meaningful review. Whether
the findings are adequate is therefore a legal
determination that requires no deference to the
Commission.
Adams v. Board of Review of Indus. Com'n, 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah App.
1991).
Petitioner's "Memorandum in Support of Appeal" clearly set
forth the relevant facts and authority regarding the issue of
knowledge.

(R. 57-59).

Since the Board's decision makes no

reference to this element, its decision should be reversed as being
arbitrary and capricious.
III. THE BOARD'S FAILURE TO CONSIDER PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT THE
EMPLOYER NEVER SHOWED THE ELEMENT OF CONTROL WAS ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS.
Petitioner testified she had a drink in the phone area, in
part, because of a strep infection from which she was suffering.
(R. 20). The ALJ, while finding that Petitioner was discharged for
cause, made no finding regarding control on the part of Petitioner.
(R. 35-40).

Therefore, Petitioner appealed to the Board on the

basis she did not have the requisite control to abide by the drink
15

policy

because

of

the strep

infection.

(R. 59).

In her

"Memorandum in Support of Appeal," (R. 53-66) Petitioner argued as
follows:
In defining control, Rule 562-5b-102(1)(c)(2), Utah
Administrative Code states:
Just cause may not be established when the
reason for discharge is based on mere
mistakes, inefficiency, failure of performance
as the result of inability or incapacity,
inadvertence, in isolated instances, good
faith errors in judgment or in the exercise of
discretion, minor but casual or unintentional
carelessness or negligence. (Emphasis added)
[R. 57].
In this situation, Claimant had a drink of water in an
area not frequented by patrons. Many other employees did
the same thing.
The policy regarding drinks in
Claimant's work area, were at best, ambiguous and vague.
She had a strep infection and was answering phones
causing her mouth to become dry. This may be classified
as a good faith error in judgment. However, it is not
sufficient to discharge for cause. [R. 57].
In it's decision, the Board never directly addressed the issue
of whether the element of control was shown by the employer.

(R.

71-75).
Petitioner's "Memorandum in Support of Appeal" clearly set
forth the relevant facts and authority regarding the issue of
control.

(R. 59). Since the Board's decision makes no reference

to this element, its decision should be reversed as being arbitrary
and capricious pursuant to Adams v. Board of Review of Indus.
Com'n, 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah App. 1991).
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IV. THE BOARD'S FAILURE TO CONSIDER PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT THAT THE
EMPLOYER NEVER SHOWED THE ACTIONS OF PETITIONER HAD A SERIOUS
EFFECT ON THE EMPLOYEE'S JOB OR THE EMPLOYER'S INTERESTS WAS
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS.
In his findings, the ALJ determined that the employer provided
no evidence that it had been harmed in any way by Petitioner's
conduct.

(R. 36). Nevertheless, the ALJ stated that the employer

had been harmed.

(R.39).

Because of these inconsistencies,

Petitioner appealed to the Board the issue of whether the employer
had showed whether Petitioner's actions had a serious effect on the
employee's job or the employer's interest.

(R. 59-60).

In her "Memorandum in Support of Appeal," (R. 53-66) Petitioner
argued as follows:
The employer has the burden of showing that "such acts
have a serious effect on the employee's job or the
employer's interests. Rule 562-5b-102(1)(c)(3), Utah
Administrative Code. [R. 59-60].
There is no evidence in the transcript of there being an
adverse effect on the Employer because of Claimant's
conduct. In fact, the ALJ stated:
"The information provided by the employer
representative cited only that the claimant
had a drink container in the work area but the
representative did not offer any information
as to how the employer was harmed by the
claimant's actions or to show the claimant had
received any warnings or disciplinary action
for her conduct." [R. 60]. (Exhibit "F" at
page 2). [R. 36].
The decision of the ALJ is very confusing in this regard.
The evidence presented does not support the Employer's
claim. The ALJ even points this out, but then goes on
and rules in favor of the Employer. The findings by the
ALJ and resulting decision are clearly contrary to
existing law, and the decision should be reversed. [R.
60].
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In it's decision, the Board never addressed the issue of
whether the employer showed the actions of Petitioner had a serious
effect on the employee's job or the employer's interests.

(R.

Il-

ls).
Petitioner's ''Memorandum in Support of Appeal,11 clearly set
forth the relevant facts and authority regarding the issue of
whether

Petitioner's

conduct

had

an

serious

employee's job or the employer's interests.

effect

on

the

(R. 59). Since the

Board's decision makes no reference to this issue, its decision
should be reversed as being arbitrary and capricious pursuant to
Adams v. Board of Review of Indus, Com'n, 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah App.
1991).
V. THE BOARD'S FAILURE TO CONSIDER PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT THAT THE
EMPLOYER NEVER MET ITS BURDEN TO SUPPORT A SHOWING OF JUST CAUSE
FOR DISCHARGE WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS.
The ALJ found that WalMart failed to provide the necessary
documentation prior to the hearing, but went ahead with the hearing
stating that his decision would be based on the testimony at
hearing.

(R. 13) The employer representative had little knowledge

of the events regarding Petitioner's discharge and requested the
court permit the reading of several employee statements.

(R. 16).

The court specifically ruled the statements to be inadmissible.
(R. 16-17)

Nevertheless, the employer representative testified

regarding the statements which the Court had already ruled to be
inadmissible.

(R. 17-18).
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Based on the foregoing facts, Petitioner appealed to the
Board, arguing the evidence produced by the employer failed to meet
the requisite burden.

(R. 60-63).

In her "Memorandum in Support of Appeal," (R. 53-66) Petitioner
argued as follows:
It is well established that the employer shoulders the
burden of proof in establishing just cause for discharge.
The employer has the burden of proof which is
the responsibility to establish the facts
resulting in the discharge. The Employer is
required by Subsection 35-4-11(7)(a) to keep
accurate records and to provide correct
information to the Department for proper
administration of the Act.
Rule 562-5b-103(1), Utah Administrative Code.

[R. 60].

As this section indicates, the employer is required to
keep adequate records and provide necessary information
to the Department. However, that was not done in this
situation. At hearing the ALJ stated:
I have reviewed through the information in the
record.
I can't read the employer's
information, I don't have a really too much of
an idea that they gave the department
originally; however, in their appeal, they
keep referring to the Claimant as "he" and I
don't understand that at all. [R. 60-61].
(Transcript of Hearing at page 1)

[R. 13].

The failure of the employer to provide information to the
department was further addressed in the ALJ's decision.
There he stated:
[T]he employer representative failed to offer
the Department
comprehensive
information
regarding the three elements of just cause in
the decision. This representative has been
involved in providing unemployment benefits to
this Department for several years and the
representative
knows
the
necessity
of
providing
complete
and
comprehensive
information to the Department." [R. 61].
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(Exhibit "F" at page 5).

[R. 39].

Information provided the St. George Job Service office
was equally lacking.
In responding to the Employer
Notice of Claim Filed, the Employer did not respond to
questions 1, 2, 3a, 3c, 3d, 3e, 4 or 5. [R. 61]. (See,
Exhibit "B"). [R. 5].
Due to the failure of the Employer to provide information
prior to hearing, the ALJ made his decision based solely
on information provided at hearing:
So, I wondered if there was some confusion
here but what I'm going to do and I want .
. I guess the point I'm trying to make is,
what is given to me today in this hearing is
what I will be basing my decision on, not so
much what's in this record. The record gives
me an idea of what the department has made
their ruling on and some general information
but I will not be basing the decision on this
record but on what is said here today. [R.
61 ].
(Transcript of hearing at page 1).

[R. 13].

WalMart's representative had limited knowledge of the
circumstances regarding Claimant's discharge. Therefore,
he requested the ALJ allow him to read statements from
WalMart management regarding Claimant's alleged conduct.
(Transcript of hearing at page 4). [R. 16].
The ALJ informed the Employer representative the
statements were hearsay stating "I won't allow it11.
(Transcript of hearing at pages 4-5). [R. 16-17].
Nevertheless, the most damning
portion
of the
representative's testimony were the hearsay statements
the ALJ had already ruled inadmissible. The statements
alleged Claimant was told on many occasions to not have
any drink in the phone area.
The representative
testified as follows:
I have a statement from Mar . . . from Peggy
Stapley, who was the Assistant Manager in
Charge and it was told to Mary about two to
three months prior to when we let her go. [R.
62].
(Transcript of Hearing at page 5).
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[R. 17].

And Janette Collinsf I have a statement from
her, who was also an Assistant Manager, who
also talked to Mary specifically about not
having it in there. [R. 62].
(Transcript of Hearing at page 6). [R. 18].
The final incident were associates came to me,
three different associates, came to me and
told me that it was still continuing, that she
wasn't changing, that she had made the
statement, of course it's hearsay because I
didn't hear her say it, but what they told me
she said is that "I don't care what management
says, I'm going to have it out here.11 [R.
62].
(Transcript of Hearing at page 6).

[R. 18].

While Claimant denied these allegations, she had no
opportunity to confront the individuals who made these
alleged statements. [R. 62-63].
In this situation the Employer provided the Department
with almost no information prior to hearing, though
required to do so. The Employer representative present
at the hearing had limited knowledge regarding the facts
of the case. The basis of his testimony was hearsay the
ALJ had ruled inadmissible. As stated previously, the
burden of proof is the Employer's.
The lack of
information provided prior to hearing and the hearsay
provided by the Employer representative clearly failed to
satisfy the Employer burden of proof in this case. [R.
63].
In it's decision, the Board never addressed the issue of
whether the employer met its burden in establishing just cause for
discharge

(R. 71-75).

Petitioner's "Memorandum in Support of Appeal11 clearly set
forth the relevant facts and authority regarding the issue of
whether the employer met its burden.

(R. 60-63).

Since the

Board's decision makes no reference to this issue, its decision
should be reversed as being arbitrary and capricious pursuant to
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Adams v. Board of Review of Indus, Com'n, 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah App.
1991).
CONCLUSION
It is well established that the Employment Security Act should
be liberally construed and administered to lighten the burdens of
the unemployed. Johnson v. Board of Review, 7 Utah 2d 113, 117-18;
320 P.2d 315 (1958).

The decision of the Board does not lighten

the burdens of Petitioner.
The determination Employer's policy requiring switchboard
operators walk a distance of 100 feet for a drink of water is not
a reasonable employment practice and certainly did not lighten
Petitioner's burden.

The Board's determination was unreasonable

and should be reversed.
The Board's failure to address the issues of knowledge,
control, serious effect on employer, and whether the employer met
its burden at hearing was arbitrary and capricious, did not lighten
Petitioner's burden and should also be reversed.
DATED this 10th day of April, 1996,
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Board of review of the Industrial
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Employment Security
140 East 300 South
P.O. Box 45244
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-
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ADDENDUM

Rule 562-5b-102(1)(a), Utah Administrative Code.
(a) Culpability.
This is the seriousness of the conduct or the severity of
the offense as it affects continuance of the employment
relationship. The discharge must have been necessary to
avoid actual or potential harm to the employer's rightful
interests.
A discharge would not be considered
f,
necessaryff if it is not consistent with reasonable
employment practices. The wrongfulness of the conduct
must be considered in the context of the particular
employment and how it affects the employer's rights. If
the conduct was an isolated incident of poor judgment and
there is no expectation that the conduct will be
continued or repeated, potential harm may not be shown
and therefore it is not necessary to discharge the
employee.

Rule 562-5b-102(1)(b), Utah Administrative Code.
(b) Knowledge.
The employee must have had a knowledge of the conduct
which the employer expected. It is not necessary that
the claimant intended to cause harm to the employer, but
he should reasonably have been able to anticipate the
effect his conduct would have. Knowledge may not be
established unless the employer gave a clear explanation
of the expected behavior or had a pertinent written
policy, except in the case of a flagrant violation of a
universal standard of behavior.
If the employer's
expectations are unclear, ambiguous or inconsistent, the
existence of knowledge is not shown. A specific warning
is one way of showing that the employee had knowledge of
the expected conduct. After the employee is given a
warning he should be given an opportunity to correct
objectionable conduct. Additional violations occurring
after the warning would be necessary to establish just
cause for a discharge.
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Rule 562-5b-102(1)(c)(2), Utah Administrative Code.
Just cause may not be established when the reason for
discharge is based on mere mistakes, inefficiency,
failure of performance as the result of inability or
incapacity, inadvertence, in isolated instances, good
faith errors in judgment or in the exercise of
discretion,
minor
but
casual
or
unintentional
carelessness or negligence. These examples of conduct
are not disqualifying because of the lack of knowledge or
control.
However, continued inefficiency, repeated
carelessness, or lack of care exercised by ordinary,
reasonable workers in similar circumstances, may be
disqualifying depending on the reason and degree of the
carelessness, the knowledge and control of the employee.

Rule 562-5b-102(1)(c)(3), Utah Administrative Code.
The term "just cause11 as used in Subsection 35-4-5(2) (a)
does not lessen the requirement that there be some fault
on the part of the employee involved. Prior to the 1983
addition of the term Mjust cause" the Commission
interpreted Subsection 5(2)(a) to require an intentional
infliction of harm or intentional disregard of the
employer's interests. The intent of the Legislature in
adding the words "just cause" to Subsection 35-4-5(2)(a)
was
apparently
to
correct
this
restrictive
interpretation. While some fault must be present, it is
sufficient that the acts were intended, the consequences
were reasonably foreseeable, and that such acts have a
serious effect on the employee's job or the employer's
interests.

Rule 562-5b-103(1), Utah Administrative Code.
The employer has the burden of proof which is the
responsibility to establish the facts resulting in the
discharge. The Employer is required by Subsection 35-411(7)(a) to keep accurate records and to provide correct
information to the Department for proper administration
of the Act. Although the employer has the burden to
establish just cause for the discharge, if sufficient
facts are obtained from the claimant, a decision will be
made based on the information available. The failure of
one party to provide information does not necessarily
result in a ruling favorable to the other party.
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Rule 562-5b-108(1)(a), Utah Administrative Code.
The reasonableness of the employer's rules will depend on
the necessity for that rule as it affects the employer's
interests. Rules which are contrary to general public
policy or which infringe upon the recognized rights and
privileges of individuals may not be reasonable. An
employer must have broader prerogatives in regulating
conduct when employees are on the job than when they are
not. An employer must be able to make rules for employee
on-the-job conduct that reasonably further the legitimate
business interests of the employer. An employer is not
required to impose only minimum standards, but there may
be some justifiable cause for violations of rules that
are unreasonable or unduly harsh, rigorous or exacting.
When rules are changed, adequate notice and reasonable
opportunity to comply must be afforded. If the employee
believes
a rule
is unreasonable, he has
the
responsibility to discuss concerns with the employer and
give the employer an opportunity to take corrective
action.

26

